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INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND TERRORISM ALERT SERVICE 1/2005

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 **GLOBAL GOVERNANCE INITIATIVE. ANNUAL REPORT.**
World Economic Forum, Global Governance Initiative. January 24, 2005.


This second annual report of the Global Governance Initiative (GGI) provides a comprehensive analysis of the world's progress towards realizing the UN's Millennium Declaration Goals, endorsed by leaders of 189 countries in 2000. The report is the culmination of a year-long independent analysis by seven groups of some of the world's leading experts in peace and security, poverty, hunger, education, health and environmental protection. The report concludes that "The world remains far off track to achieve its most important goals." Although the responsibility for achieving global goals rests primarily with governments, the report argues that the goals cannot be reached without the active participation of the private sector. A special chapter on the private sector shows that business can contribute in four crucial ways:

- * Through developing new products to tackle global challenges and finding profitable ways to deliver affordable goods and services to the poor;
- * Through hybrid business/philanthropic activities that have both social and business benefits, e.g. HIV/AIDS treatment programs and public-private water partnerships;
- * Through strategic corporate philanthropy and social investment, especially on issues most relevant to the particular company's expertise and other assets;
- * Through responsible business engagement in public policy dialogue, rule-making and institution-building.

Full Report: http://www.weforum.org/pdf/gqi2005_low.pdf [pdf format, 125 pages]

Executive Summary: http://www.weforum.org/pdf/gqi2005_summary.pdf [pdf format, 4 pages]

U.S. FOREIGN RELATIONS


 **SECURITY, REFORM, AND PEACE: THE THREE PILLARS OF U.S. STRATEGY IN THE MIDDLE EAST. [2005 PRESIDENTIAL STUDY GROUP REPORT]**
Washington Institute for Near East Policy. February 17, 2005.

According to this report, the United States is facing an extraordinary moment of challenge in the Middle East, one that demands an integrated U.S. strategy built on a set of three pillars: security, reform, and peace. If the United States wants not just to combat the threats it faces in the region but also to change the regional dynamic which produces such threats, the administration should also pursue political, social, and economic reform in Middle East countries and the promotion of a secure Arab-Israeli peace. The authors outline what they consider to be the Bush administration's most pressing Middle East priorities for 2005:

- * Speeding the training and fielding of new Iraqi security forces while building the structure of a free and representative Iraqi government.
- * Coordinating strategy on Iran's nuclear program with key European and Security Council powers.
- * Developing and implementing a comprehensive strategy to fight the ideological war against Islamist extremism.
- * Injecting presidential leadership into calls for political reform.
- * Investing in Palestinian political and security change and a peaceful and orderly Israeli disengagement from Gaza.

[This report was endorsed by a fifty-three member bipartisan panel whose Steering Committee includes Madeleine Albright, Samuel Berger, Howard Berman, Roy Blunt, Leslie Gelb, Newt Gingrich, Alexander Haig, Max M. Kampelman, Jeane Kirkpatrick, Samuel Lewis, Joseph Lieberman, Robert McFarlane, R. James Woolsey, and Mortimer Zuckerman.]

<http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/html/pdf/PSG2005.pdf> [pdf format, 102 pages]

 **U.S.-RUSSIAN RELATIONS: THE CASE FOR AN UPGRADE.**
Andrew Kuchins, Vyacheslav Nikonov, and Dmitri Trenin.
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (CEIP). January 26, 2005.

The authors of this report point to the recent Ukrainian elections to illustrate the fragility of U.S.-Russian relations. They present an overview of how Russia and the United States understand their broader interests in international relations, to what extent their goals and interests overlap and how in the coming years the two nations may be able to increase that overlap. According to the authors, the driving factors now and in the foreseeable future that will promote closer U.S. and Russian interests will be mainly in the security and energy realms. In terms of security issues, the U.S. and Russia broadly share interests in combating terrorism and preventing proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Despite a common interest of peace and stability across Eurasia, the two

countries have competing visions and goals in the former Soviet states, and as the recent presidential elections in Ukraine displayed, different perceptions prevent deep cooperation. Moscow's status as an energy superpower possessing the largest overall hydrocarbon (oil and natural gas) reserves in the world is increasingly significant for U.S. policy and commercial interests.

<http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/USRussianRelationsENG.pdf> [pdf format, 24 pages]

TERRORISM

DISSUADING TERROR: STRATEGIC INFLUENCE AND THE STRUGGLE AGAINST TERRORISM.

Kim Cragin and Scott Gerwehr.

RAND. Web-posted February 21, 2005.

U.S. government decision-makers face a number of challenges as they attempt to form strategic influence policies that aim to dissuade terrorists from attacking the United States, divert youths from joining terrorist groups, and persuade the leaders of states and nongovernmental institutions to withhold support for terrorists. At the outset, the authors describe strategic influence policy as "the use of public diplomacy and other information campaigns to promote national security." The successes or failures of such policies and campaigns have long-lasting effects. Research findings in this report, say the authors, can help U.S. decision-makers more closely refine how and in what circumstances strategic influence campaigns can best be applied. Cragin and Gerwehr develop case studies using the examples of post-World War II Germany, Vietnam, and Eastern Europe during the Cold War. From these cases they developed the following general guidelines for developing effective influence campaigns:

- * Match Operational Objectives, Message, and Delivery to the Audience.
- * Incorporate Feedback Mechanisms into the Campaign.
- * Set Realistic Expectations.

Full Report:

http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2005/RAND_MG184.pdf [pdf format, 136 pages]

Summary:

http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2005/RAND_MG184.sum.pdf [pdf format, 10 pages]

U.S.-EU [EUROPEAN UNION] COOPERATION AGAINST TERRORISM

Kristin Archick.

Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service. January 19, 2005.

As part of the European Union's (EU's) efforts to combat terrorism since September 11, the EU has made improving law enforcement cooperation with the United States a top priority. The Bush Administration and Members of Congress have largely welcomed this EU initiative in the hopes that it will help root out terrorist cells in Europe and beyond that could be planning other attacks against the United States or its interests. This is in line with the 9/11 Commission's recommendations that the United States should develop a "comprehensive coalition strategy" against Islamist terrorism, "exchange terrorist information with trusted allies," and improve border security through better international cooperation. Some measures in the resulting Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-458) mirror these sentiments and are consistent with U.S.-EU counterterrorism efforts, especially those aimed at improving border controls and transport security. U.S.-EU cooperation against terrorism has led to a new dynamic in U.S.-EU relations by fostering dialogue on law enforcement and homeland security issues previously reserved for bilateral discussions. Despite some frictions, most U.S. policymakers and analysts view the developing partnership in these areas as positive, and one of the relative bright spots in the recently much-strained transatlantic relationship. At the June 2004 U.S.-EU Summit in Ireland, the two sides issued a joint declaration on combating terrorism that reinforces their commitment to work together on this global challenge. However, the United States and the EU continue to face several challenges as they seek to promote closer cooperation in the police, judicial, and border control fields.

<http://www.fas.org/man/crs/RS22030.pdf> [pdf format, 6 pages]

AL QAEDA: STATEMENTS AND EVOLVING IDEOLOGY

Christopher M. Blanchard.

Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service. February 4, 2005.

Recent statements from Osama Bin Laden, Ayman Al Zawahiri, and Abu Musab Al Zarqawi display the uncompromising commitment of Al Qaeda's leaders and affiliates to a consistent ideological agenda focused on the expulsion of foreign forces and influences from Islamic societies and the creation of an Islamic state ruled by sharia law. The political prescriptions outlined in the statements are rooted in an Islamic principle known as tawhid, or the principle of the absolute unity of God and an identification of Islam as an all-encompassing religious, political, and social system. According to this perspective, Islamic faith, adherence to Islamic law, and implementation of conservative Islamic social and political principles are synonymous. Throughout their recent statements, Bin Laden, Zawahiri, and Zarqawi characterized as "infidels" those who do not share these beliefs, those who oppose the creation of an Islamic state on the terms they describe, and those supporting existing governments and coalition activities in the Islamic world.

<http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RL32759.pdf> [pdf format, 14 pages]

✚ U.S. MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM:
AFGHANISTAN, AFRICA, THE PHILIPPINES, AND COLOMBIA

Andrew Feickert.

Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service. February 4, 2005.

U.S. military operations as part of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) began on October 7, 2001 and continue today. The military component is just one aspect in this endeavor, which also involves diplomacy, intelligence, law enforcement, and financial efforts intended to defeat terrorists around the world. This report focuses on U.S. military operations in four areas — Afghanistan, Africa, the Philippines, and Colombia — although the U.S. military is likely engaged in a variety of activities in other countries or regions that are considered part of the GWOT by the Administration. Congress has a wide-ranging interest in U.S. military operations in these regions. U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) have played a central role in all four of these U.S. military operations — not just in direct combat but also other roles such as training and civil affairs — and their use raises a variety of issues for potential congressional consideration. Some experts suggest that U.S. military operations in Afghanistan, Africa, the Philippines, and Colombia provide many valuable lessons, which could not only be useful for U.S. forces in Iraq but also in the planning and conduct of future GWOT operations. In Afghanistan, some credit the implementation of a decentralized counterinsurgency strategy in 2003, along with a “broad international backing” with helping to stabilize the situation enough so that elections could be conducted and reconstruction could proceed in a relatively secure environment. Operations in Africa, the Philippines, and Colombia might also have implications for future operations. These three operations, spearheaded by U.S. Special Operations forces, are low-key — frequently involving a few hundred U.S. troops — and focus on training and advising indigenous forces in counter-terror and counterinsurgency operations. Some suggest that an indirect benefit is that these operations involve few, if any, U.S. casualties — an issue which could have implications for ongoing and future GWOT operations. Another observation is that these operations, because they are not resource-intensive, can be sustained over a long period of time, which many feel is important when attempting to destroy established terrorist networks or defeating insurgencies.

<http://www.fas.org/man/crs/RL32758.pdf> [pdf format, 20 pages]

✚ INTELLIGENCE REFORM AND TERRORISM PREVENTION ACT OF 2004: “LONE WOLF” AMENDMENT TO THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT

Elizabeth B. Bazan.

Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service. December 29, 2004.

Section 6001 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, P.L. 108-458, amended the definition of “agent of a foreign power” in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), 50 U.S.C. § 1801(b)(1), to add a new category of individuals covered by the law’s provisions. Under the new “lone wolf” provision, a non-United States person who engages in international terrorism or activities in preparation for

international terrorism is deemed to be an “agent of a foreign power” under FISA. The new provision does not change the procedures to be used to apply for a court order authorizing electronic surveillance or a physical search under FISA. If an order is sought under this definition of an “agent of a foreign power,” however, the applicant is not required to demonstrate a connection between the target of the electronic surveillance or the physical search and a foreign nation, foreign group, or international terrorist group. Nor does the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC), in approving such an order, have to find probable cause to believe that such a connection existed. Rather, if the court authorizes such a surveillance or physical search using this new definition of “agent of a foreign power,” the FISC judge has to find, in pertinent part, that based upon the information provided by the applicant for the order, the target had engaged in or was engaging in international terrorism or activities in preparation for terrorism.

<http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RS22011.pdf> [pdf format, 6 pages]

ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS FOR MONEY SERVICES BUSINESSES WITH RESPECT TO FOREIGN AGENTS OR FOREIGN COUNTERPARTIES. INTERPRETIVE RELEASE 2004-1.

United States Department of Treasury. Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN). December 8, 2004.

Since April 2002, Money Services Businesses have been required to establish anti-money laundering programs to guard against money laundering and terrorist financing. Today's Guidance specifically requires that, to the extent a Money Services Business (MSB) uses relationships with foreign agents and counterparties to facilitate the movement of funds into or out of the United States, the Money Services Business' anti-money laundering program must reasonably address the risks of money laundering and the financing of terrorism posed those relationships with foreign agents or foreign counterparties. The Guidance applies only to Money Services Businesses required to register with FinCEN, as these are the entities most likely to use foreign agents or foreign counterparties in their operations. The Guidance requires that a Money Services Business' anti-money laundering program be capable of detecting the abuse of products and services offered through foreign agents and counterparties by establishing procedures for: (1) conducting due diligence on foreign agents and counterparties; (2) risk-based monitoring of foreign agents and counterparties; and (3) taking corrective action or terminating relationships, as appropriate.

<http://www.fincen.gov/msbagentadvisory.pdf> [pdf format, 12 pages]

LATIN AMERICA

TOWARD A NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT IN LATIN AMERICA. Nancy Birdsall and Rachel Menezes.

Center for Global Development; Inter-American Dialogue. December 28, 2004.

This policy brief asserts that new economic revitalization standards are needed in Latin America to counteract deep-seated frustration over the lackluster performance of the last decade: "More than a decade of renewed democracy and open market economic reforms have failed to deliver much growth or social progress, causing a spiral of anxiety and deep frustration in the region— with the political process, with political leadership, and with the way democracy is working. The authors propose reforms in four major areas in order to reinvigorate economic expansion while simultaneously allowing lower and middle classes in the region to partake more fully in this growth:

- * A radical fiscal policy aimed at creating a strong fiscal base and lower interest rates.

- * A fair fiscal system that makes taxes and expenditures more progressive.

- * Job creation and protection of workers' rights.

- * Access to rich country markets.

http://www.cgdev.org/docs/CGDev-IAD_Brief_6a.pdf.pdf [pdf format, 8 pages]

LATIN AMERICA: TERRORISM ISSUES.

Mark P. Sullivan.

Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service. Updated January 14, 2005.

In the aftermath of the September 2001 terrorist attacks on New York and Washington D.C., U.S. attention to terrorism in Latin America intensified, with an increase in bilateral and regional cooperation. Latin American nations strongly condemned the attacks, and took action through the Organization of American States (OAS) to strengthen hemispheric cooperation. In June 2002, OAS members signed an Inter-American Convention Against Terrorism. President Bush submitted the convention to the Senate in November 2002 for its advice and consent, and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee held a public hearing on June 17, 2004. In its annual report on worldwide terrorism, the State Department highlights threats in Colombia, Peru, and the tri-border region of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay. The State Department also has designated four terrorist groups (three in Colombia and one in Peru) as Foreign Terrorist Organizations, and Cuba has been listed as a state sponsor of terrorism since 1982.

<http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RS21049.pdf> [pdf format, 6 pages]

IRAN

IRAN'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

Sharon Squassoni.

Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service. Updated January 14, 2005.

Inspections in 2003 and 2004 of Iran's nuclear program revealed significant undeclared activities with potential application for nuclear weapons. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) uncovered two uranium enrichment programs (centrifuges and lasers) and plutonium separation efforts. Iran has been pressured to give up its enrichment and reprocessing activities and has declared twice (November 2003 and November 2004) that it would halt all such activities in exchange for technical cooperation with Germany, France, and the UK. It is not clear whether Iran is buying time for a clandestine program or effectively using its program as a bargaining chip for wider economic gain. Iran signed an Additional Protocol to its safeguards agreement in December 2003, but has not yet ratified it. Ever on the brink of being declared in violation of the NPT, Iran has allowed IAEA inspectors access only when pressed. After several months, Iran recently agreed to let inspectors visit a military site: Parchin. This report analyzes the significance of the IAEA's findings for a possible Iranian nuclear weapons program.

<http://www.fas.org/sqp/crs/nuke/RS21592.pdf> [pdf format, 6 pages]

ISIS [INSTITUTE FOR SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY] IMAGERY BRIEFS

Institute for Science and International Security [ISIS]. Web- posted March 4, 2005.

Satellite photos of controversial nuclear facilities in Iran:

- 1) Iran Constructing The 40 Mw Heavy Water Reactor At Arak Despite Calls Not To Do So By The European Union And The IAEA Board Of Governors [March 4, 2005];
- 2) New Satellite Images Show Tunnel Construction At Esfahan Facility In Iran [February 17, 2005].

Images, March 4, 2005:

<http://www.isis-online.org/publications/iran/arakconstruction.html> [html format, photos in jpg format]

Images, February 17, 2005:

<http://www.isis-online.org/publications/iran/esfahantunnels.html> [html format, photos in jpg format]

IRAN IS NOT AN ISLAND: A STRATEGY TO MOBILIZE THE NEIGHBORS

George Perkovich.

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (CEIP). February 1, 2005.

This report notes that several general factors, either alone or in combination could delay Iran's acquisition of nuclear weapons: Iranian technical difficulties, U.S. military action, and European diplomacy are the main forces that could affect the probability and pace of nuclear program development. However, says the author, neither delay nor regime change would remove the causes of proliferation pressures in Iran. Rather, he says, "Iran needs to be assured that the U.S. will respect its autonomy if it ceases nuclear weapons development, while Iran's neighbors need to be reassured that Tehran will

respect their interests. Arab governments are reluctant to join in a regional security dialogue in part because of Washington's double standard regarding Israel's nuclear arsenal and treatment of Palestinians. To mobilize all of the international actors opposing Iranian nuclear development, the U.S. must recognize that Iranian proliferation, Persian Gulf security, the U.S. role in the Middle East, Israel's nuclear status, and Palestinian-Israeli relations are all linked and cannot be resolved without a more balanced U.S. stance."

<http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/PB34.perkovich.final.web1.pdf> [pdf format, 8 pages]

IRAQ

IRAQ: WITHOUT CONSENSUS, DEMOCRACY IS NOT THE ANSWER

Marina Ottaway.

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. March 2005.

The Iraqi elections were a success, says the author of this report, but they do not ensure that Iraqis can now agree on a constitutional formula that accommodates the demands of all groups and keeps the country together. Democracy as separation of powers, checks and balances, and protection of individual rights has not proven enough to avoid conflict in other deeply divided societies. Ottaway stresses that Iraqis will have to confront their differences and negotiate solution for democracy to thrive. If they fail, she claims, the United States will be faced with a choice of whether to keep the country together by force or get out—and it is better to find out sooner rather than later.

<http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/PB36.ottaway.FINAL.pdf> [pdf format, 8 pages]

DARFUR

REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF INQUIRY ON DARFUR TO THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY-GENERAL.

United Nations, International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur. January 25, 2005.

This report by a United Nations-appointed commission of inquiry into whether genocide has occurred in Sudan's war-torn Darfur region has found that the Government and Janjaweed militia are responsible for crimes under international law and strongly recommends referring the dossier to the International Criminal Court (ICC). While concluding that the Government has not pursued a policy of genocide, the Commission found that Government forces and militias "conducted indiscriminate attacks, including

killing of civilians, torture, enforced disappearances, destruction of villages, rape and other forms of sexual violence, pillaging and forced displacement.”

http://www.un.org/News/dh/sudan/com_inq_darfur.pdf [pdf format, 176 pages]

OTHER WORLD REGIONS

✚ CHINA ON THE MOVE: A FRANCO-AMERICAN ANALYSIS OF EMERGING CHINESE STRATEGIC POLICIES AND THEIR CONSEQUENCES FOR TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS.

David C. Gompert, Francois Godement, Evan S. Medeiros and James C. Mulvenon.
RAND. Web-posted March 9, 2005.

This report is the product of a conference, jointly sponsored by the RAND Corporation National Defense Research Institute (NDRI) and Centre Asie Ifri and held in Paris in June 2003. The chapters in the report were written by researchers from both organizations and subsequently edited to produce a mutually acceptable consensus document. The volume cited here represents a transatlantic view of Chinese national strategy and capabilities and offers a common path for engaging rising Chinese power. Its aim is not to compare official French, European, or U.S. approaches to China, but to examine the issues through the U.S.-French prism. This approach has facilitated analysis of how to develop a transatlantic, U.S.-Europe dimension of China policy. The U.S. and the countries of Europe have different perspectives towards China. The authors note that “this suggests the possibility of a triangle--if a rather oddly shaped one--among China, Europe, and America, with a disquieting potential if translated into strategic maneuvering by each between the other two. Presently, neither the United States nor the EU and its member states, including France, explicitly or implicitly base their relations with China on triangular calculations. Rather, the two follow parallel interests vis-à-vis China: utilizing its productive capacities, accessing its potentially vast market, committing it to international trade rules, and shaping its policies on nonproliferation, human rights, and environmental security.”

Full Report:

http://www.rand.org/pubs/conf_proceedings/2005/RAND_CF199.pdf [pdf format, 66 pages]

Summary:

http://www.rand.org/pubs/conf_proceedings/2005/RAND_CF199.sum.pdf [pdf format, 9 pages]

✚ ENGAGING RUSSIA AS PARTNER AND PARTICIPANT: THE NEXT STAGE OF NATO-RUSSIA RELATIONS.

Robert E. Hunter and Sergey M. Rogov.
RAND. 2004; Web-posted January 4, 2005.

Relations between the Russian Federation and the West have evolved steadily since the end of the Cold War. In late 2001, RAND and the Moscow-based Institute for the USA and Canada Studies created a working group that examined ways to increase cooperation between NATO and Russia. The group concluded that Russia should become more deeply involved, as an equal partner, in NATO deliberations, including in regard to the Middle East, the Caucasus, and Central Asia. The goal is to share responsibilities and build security across Eurasia. During the course of its deliberations and other work between April 2003 and May 2004, the working group met in six formal and informal sessions: twice in Moscow (June 30–July 1, 2003 and March 14–16, 2004), once in Brussels (October 17–19, 2003), and twice at RAND's offices in Arlington, Virginia, with project members conducting further explorations in Brussels (March 4–5, 2004). The current report is the collective product of the 42 U.S., Russian, Canadian, and European members of the working group. The members focus on a few particularly important areas in which cooperation could be enhanced. These are centered around three subjects: the completion of the 20th century security agenda in Europe; the opening of the 21st century security agenda beyond Europe (especially as defined functionally by terrorism and weapons of mass destruction and geographically as the region between the Mediterranean and Central Asia); and the unresolved issue of the long-term future of Russia's relationship with, and potentially within NATO.

Full Report:

http://www.rand.org/pubs/conf_proceedings/2005/RAND_CF203.pdf [pdf format, 84 pages]

THE MUSLIM WORLD AFTER 9/11.

Angel M. Rabasa, Cheryl Benard, Peter Chalk, C. Christine Fair, Theodore Karasik, Rollie Lal, Ian Lesser and David Thaler.

RAND. Web-posted December 15, 2004.

This study, a collection of reports on various aspects of the contemporary Muslim world, explores three key cleavages within the Muslim world and their implications for U.S. policy:

- * Only 15 percent of the Muslim world is Shi'ite, a group often politically excluded in Middle East countries by Sunni majorities. Because the Iraqi Shi'ites want to play a greater role in the governance of Iraq, this presents opportunities for the U.S. and its allies to form stable relationships and policies towards the Shi'ites that promote religious and political freedoms.

- * While only 20 percent of the world's Muslims are Arabs, interpretations of Islam are often viewed through an Arab lens. Arabs face a unique set of political, economic and social problems. Repressive and often authoritarian regimes dominate Arab nations, while non-Arab sectors are more inclusive and democratic, and more conducive to innovative, contemporary Islamic ideas.

- * RAND researchers say that the U.S. needs to understand tribal politics and dynamics in areas where forces may be operating to better understand and learn how to manage

subnational and tribal issues. The authors collectively identify causes for the spread of Islamic radicalism over the past several decades, grouping them into three categories: conditions, processes and catalytic events. 1) Conditions — The widespread failure of political and economic models has caused instability and disenfranchisement of segments of the Muslim population, fueling anger towards the West. The decentralized religious authority in Sunni Islam has opened the door for religious extremist influence. 2) Processes — The resurgence of Islam in the Middle East over the past 30 years, along with the spread of Middle Eastern funding and ideology throughout the world, has fueled support for fundamentalism and radical Muslim ideology. In areas lacking a strong central government, radical Muslim ideology often fills the vacuum, producing strong networks that support fundamentalism and terrorism. 3) Catalytic events — Major events such as the Iranian revolution, the Afghan war with the Soviet Union, the Gulf War of 1991, the Iraqi war, and the September 11 terrorist attacks have polarized and radicalized the Muslim world. This study analyzes the long-term impact of these events on the Muslim world and on U.S. interests.

Full Report: http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2004/RAND_MG246.pdf [pdf format, 567 pages]

Summary: http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2004/RAND_MG246.sum.pdf [pdf format, 15 pages]

KOSOVO: TOWARD FINAL STATUS

International Crisis Group (ICG). January 24, 2005.

This report examines the mounting tensions in Kosovo and says that independence is the only solution that can dispel the gathering storm. Over the past five years, the final status issue has been delayed and ignored while Kosovo's two million people continue to exist in an international limbo. The population, 90 per cent of them ethnic Albanian, will never accept a return to Belgrade rule, but the international community has yet to grasp their increasing discontent, even after the deadly rioting in March 2004. The authors argue that Kosovo's independence must come soon, but only on the basis of a number of conditions being met, and the report sets out a timeline of decisions and events that would lead to an internationally recognized Kosovo by mid-2006. The situation in Kosovo is increasingly dangerous, threatening wide-scale unrest and even renewed war. Urgent progress must be made toward establishing Kosovo as an independent state, but only on the basis of fully guaranteed protections for its Serb and other minorities, says ICG. Either 2005 will see the start of a final status solution that consolidates peace and development or Kosovo may return to conflict and generate regional instability. As a first step, the report urges the six-nation Contact Group to issue as soon as possible a statement spelling out a schedule for the resolution of the status issue, with independence as the goal. Such a statement will need to contain some crucial ground-rules: that the protection of minority rights is the issue on which progress will most depend, and that neither Kosovo's return to Belgrade's rule, nor its partition, nor any possible unification of Kosovo with Albania or any neighboring state or territory will be supported.

http://www.icg.org/library/documents/europe/balkans/161_kosovo_toward_final_status.pdf [pdf format, 41 pages on A4 paper]

KOREAN REUNIFICATION: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES AND NORTHEAST ASIA.

Charles L. (Jack) Pritchard.

Brookings Institution. January 14, 2005.

The author argues that the reunification itself of the Korean peninsula is less important than when and how the reunification takes place. He favors a gradual unification, as this would have a better chance of political success and would entail less financial hardship for the South Korean populace. One potential problem with gradualism, however, is that the U.S. and other countries may find that any attempts at gradual reunification as a strengthening, albeit limited, of the Kim Jong-il regime. Pritchard also contemplates the roles of regional organization, arguing for a new Northeast Asia Security Dialogue (NEASD).

<http://www.brookings.edu/views/papers/fellows/pritchard20050114.pdf> [pdf format, 12 pages]

AL-QAEDA IN SAUDI ARABIA. ASYMMETRIC THREATS AND ISLAMIST EXTREMISTS.

Anthony H. Cordesman and Nawaf Obaid.

Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Revised January 26, 2005.

This report claims that although Al Qaeda has killed people in Saudi Arabia and damaged the Kingdom's economy, it has not been able to get as strong a grip as it would like. The authors argue that Al Qaeda has been unsuccessful in its recruiting efforts, has failed to define a viable alternative to the existing government structure, and has been deprived of enough funding to build a strong network of terrorist cells. But the group remains powerful both inside and outside the Kingdom. Despite being able to keep some facets at bay, say the authors, "Saudi Arabia is at a critical juncture in its fight against terrorism. The threat is unlikely to disappear for years to come. Al Qaeda can draw on Saudis in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, and Central Asia, as well as other members of al-Qaeda who may be able to enter Saudi Arabia. The Iraqi and Yemeni borders present serious problems in terms of infiltration." The authors say that the roots of attraction for Islamic extremism are not easily eradicated without dealing with the sources of unrest. The Saudi government must do more, they say, to open up opportunities in the Kingdom for those who have been denied any voice in the economic and political systems that hold powerful sway.

http://www.csis.org/burke/reports/050106_Al-QaedainSaudi.pdf [pdf format, 25 pages]

COUNTRY PROFILES.

Library of Congress, Federal Research Division. Updated December 17, 2004.

According to the Library of Congress' Country Studies website: "This series of profiles of foreign nations is part of the Country Studies Program, formerly the Army Area Handbook Program. The profiles offer brief, summarized information on a country's historical background, geography, society, economy, transportation and telecommunications, government and politics, and national security. In addition to being featured in the front matter of published Country Studies, they are now being prepared as stand-alone reference aides for all countries in the series, as well as for a number of additional countries of interest. The profiles offer reasonably current country information independent of the existence of a recently published Country Study and will be updated annually or more frequently as events warrant." Profiles have already been completed for Colombia, India, Indonesia, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, North Korea, Russia, Sudan, Tajikistan, Turkey, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Profiles will be added for the following: Afghanistan, China, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Iraq, Kenya, Libya, Mali, Pakistan, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, Syria, Taiwan, Venezuela and Vietnam.
<http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/profiles.html> [Gateway to individual country profiles, profiles in pdf format, various pagings]

ARMS CONTROL / NONPROLIFERATION

MISSIONS FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS AFTER THE COLD WAR.

Ivan Oelrich.

Federation of American Scientists (FAS). January 28, 2005.

This report examines currently proposed nuclear missions and finds that the United States is witnessing the end of a long process in which nuclear weapons are displaced by advanced conventional alternatives. The Administration has declared four goals for nuclear weapons: assurance, dissuasion, deterrence, and target destruction. This study evaluates nuclear weapons by how well they meet each goal for each mission. That nuclear weapons can destroy most targets proposed for them is not in question. But they must be compared to alternatives, and benefits must be weighed against costs. For most missions, recent advances in precision guidance leave little or no relative advantage for nuclear weapons. The costs of using nuclear weapons, however, are large compared to conventional weapons. Some of these costs, such as radioactive fallout, are incurred on the battlefield. Other costs, such as proliferation incentives, are incurred even if the nuclear weapons are never actually used. Changes in the strategic environment, including the end of the Cold War, the collapse of the Soviet Union, dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, the rising conventional dominance of the United States, and the growing non-state threat have reduced the number of missions that might warrant weapons of such enormous power. Oelrich says that the most challenging nuclear mission is a holdover from the Cold War: to be able to carry out a disarming first

strike against Russian central nuclear forces. Only if the US and Russia abandon this mission will meaningful reductions in the two largest arsenals be possible.

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